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INDEPENDENT CREATION IN A WORLD OF AI
Clark D. Asay*
ABSTRACT
Scholars have long debated whether the outputs of AI systems should
be subject to copyright. On the one hand, the automated nature of many AI
systems may make copyright unnecessary as an incentive for the creation of
withholding copyright protections from them. On the other hand, those
outputs often exhibit sufficient creativity to merit copyright protection, and
without copyright, parties that use AI systems to create such outputs may lack
the necessary incentives to do so.
In this Essay, prepared as part of the Florida International University
t, I argue that copyright
ependent creation defense, as well as the widespread availability of
AI systems for helping authors in their creative efforts, helps address some
of the concerns embedded in these debates. Historically, the independent
creation defense has rarely applied, simply because independent creation of
similar expression is highly unusual. But as this Essay explores, AI increases
the likelihood of multiple parties creating similar expression independently,
meaning that the defense can help defuse worries that applying copyright to
AI outputs will result in a copyright quagmire. Furthermore, the availability
of AI systems for assisting authors in their creative efforts means that authors
have tools for more readily creating unique works that avoid many of the
remaining copyright landmines.
Other copyright issues linger, however, and the last part of this Essay
examines some of these concerns in brief. In particular, parties may wish to
use specific AI outputs in their own creative efforts, and neither the
independent creation defense nor the availability of AI tools for creating
something unique helps
defense may, however, and the Essay concludes by briefly examining how.
I.
II.
III.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Copyright scholars have long wrestled with whether the outputs of AI
systems should be subject to copyright.1 Some argue that the outputs should
be subject to copyright when implementing the AI systems and the outputs
themselves both involve creativity.2 In contrast, others argue that mostly
automated AI systems do not need copyright incentives to yield their outputs,
and that copyright, therefore, should not apply to those outputs.3 Relatedly,
others have reasoned that in cases where creative outputs cannot be directly
traced to an author and their creative purposes, copyright should not protect
such works.4
This Essay argues that these debates, while important, fail to
s
the growing availability of AI systems for assisting creative parties, helps
address at least some of the concerns embedded in those debates. The
independent creation defense excuses a party whose work is identical or
similar to that of another party from copyright liability if that party developed
it independently of the other.5 Historically, this defense has rarely played a
t already fulfill. For starters, the
likelihood of two independent parties developing the same or similar creative

1 For an early treatment of this issue, see Pamela Samuelson, Allocating Ownership Rights in
Computer-Generated Works, 47 U. PITT. L. REV. 1185 (1986).
2 See, e.g., Nina I. Brown, Artificial Authors: A Case for Copyright in Computer-Generated
Works, 20 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 1 (2018); Robert C. Denicola, Ex Machina: Copyright Protection
for Computer-Generated Works, 69 RUTGERS U. L. REV. 251, 271, 272 (2016) (essentially making this
argument); cf. James Grimmelman, There s No Such Thing as a Computer-Authored Work And It s a
Good Thing, Too, 39 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 403 (2016) (arguing that authors using AI systems to create
works raises no vital differences from when authors use other tools such as pen and paper to create works,
meaning that general copyright principles apply similarly in the AI context as in others).
3 Ralph D. Clifford, Intellectual Property in the Era of the Creative Computer Program: Will the
True Creator Please Stand Up?, 71 TUL. L. REV. 1675, 1699 1702 (1996); Samuelson, supra note 1, at
1199; see also Annemarie Bridy, The Evolution of Authorship: Work Made by Code, 39 COLUM. J.L. &
ARTS 395, 400 01 (2016) (suggesting that policy reasons may disfavor copyright for AI-generated works,
but that the works-made-for-hire doctrine is already a tool in U.S. copyright law for accommodating nonhuman authors).
4 Bruce E. Boyden, Emergent Works, 39 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 377, 390 91 (2016).
5 John F. Duffy, Inventing Invention: A Case Study of Legal Innovation, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1, 8
(2007).
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output is simply slim.6 Furthermore, when two parties do develop similar
creative outputs independent of each other, those similarities typically lie in
unprotectable elements such as ideas or scenes a faire, not protectable
expression.7 Other copyright limitations thus already shoulder much of
whatever burden the independent creation defense in copyright was meant to
carry.
But in the context of AI systems and their outputs, the independent
creation defense is poised to take on greater prominence, thereby helping
address some of the concerns of both those for and against subjecting the
outputs of AI systems to copyright. The independent creation defense is
likely to increase in importance in the AI context because AI systems
utilizing widely available public domain techniques and similar inputs may
often yield similar creative outputs that are nonetheless independently
derived.8 Hence, multiple parties may claim copyright in the similar creative
9
outputs of their systems without infrin
This reality does not fully eliminate the concern that the mass increase in
creative outputs that AI systems enable will seed the artistic landscape with
copyright minefields if those creative outputs are subject to copyright.10 Yet
the growing availability of AI systems capable of assisting parties in their
creative efforts means that parties have an easier time coming up with
creative outputs that are not only independently derived, but lacking in
similarity as well.11
Hence, though some may worry that allowing copyright to apply to an
-on creativity, the
independent creation defense would appear to be a viable defense to excuse
-assisted works. Or, in the alternative, widely
6 Id. at 9 ( [W]hile it is theoretically possible for an entire book or song to be independently created
by two individuals, as a practical matter the chances of that happening are virtually zero. ).
7 Id. (discussing how limiting copyright protection to actual expression, rather than general
concepts and themes, sufficiently protects authors).
8 Dirk Knemeyer & Jonathan Follett, Could Machines Become Creative?, MEDIUM (June 13,
2019), https://towardsdatascience.com/could-machines-become-creative-49f346dcd3a3 (discussing some
of the abilities and limitations of AI in producing creative outputs); Ronald Schmelzer, Artificial
Intelligence Creativity Tools Mimic Human Ability, SEARCHENTERPRISEAI (Mar. 26, 2019),
https://searchenterpriseai.techtarget.com/feature/-Artificial-intelligence-creativity-tools-mimic-humanability (discussing open source AI tools that allow media companies to input data to obtain automatically
generated text).
9 Duffy, supra note 5, at 8.
10 Or, for that matter, that AI-generated works will infringe copyrighted works upon which they
relied for inputs. See Timothy Geigner, Art, AI & Infringement: A Copyright Conundrum, TECHDIRT (Oct.
16, 2018, 7:46 PM), https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20181005/09595440788/art-ai-infringementcopyright-conundrum.shtml.
11 See James Vincent, Runway ML Puts AI Tools in the Hands of Creators Everywhere, THE
VERGE (July 10, 2019, 8:00 AM), https://www.theverge.com/2019/7/10/20682307/ai-machine-learningeasy-to-use-models-creatives-runway-ml.
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available AI systems can help parties readily create something dissimilar or
unique. These points obviously do not eliminate all concerns. In particular,
parties may often wish to use specific AI outputs, in which cases neither the
independent creation defense nor the availability of AI tools provides much
by briefly assessing how the fair use doctrine might play a role in allowing
such uses.
Below, I first briefly discuss some of the background literature on the
debate regarding whether AI-assisted creative works should be subject to
copyright. I then make the argument that the independent creation defense,
as well as the growing availability of AI systems for assisting parties in their
creative efforts, addresses some of the concerns that others have raised. I
conclude with some brief thoughts on outstanding issues going forward,
including how the fair use defense may apply in the context of AI outputs.
II. THE COPYRIGHTABILITY OF AI OUTPUTS
Commentators have long debated whether the outputs of AI systems
deserve copyright protections. In this Part, I briefly survey this field, while
A significant group of scholars and commentators have argued that
copyright cannot apply to automatically generated creative outputs because
those outputs lack human authors.12 In other words, because the computer
program is in some sense the creator of many of these outputs, copyright
cannot apply to them. Though the Copyright Act does not specifically
indicate that authors must be human, many commentators and scholars
believe that such a condition is implied.13 This no-human-author-thereforeno-copyright approach seems to have been the position of the Register of
Copyrights as early as 1965, and since then it has grown in acceptance.14 In
fact, it is currently the official position of the U.S. Copyright Office.15
Part of the rationale behind this position seems connected to the
dominant theory behind copyright in the U.S. This theory holds that society
12 2 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 3:45 (2016) ( Copyright extends only to works
of human authors. ); 1 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT § 2.2.2 (3d ed. 2014) (indicating
that copyright should not apply to a computer-generated product for which the only human intervention
is the hand that turned on the machine ).
13 See, e.g., Clifford, supra note 3, at 1682 ( Although not specifically defined, the use of the term
author in the Copyright Act implies that Congress meant a human author. ).
14 See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, SIXTY-EIGHTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF
COPYRIGHTS FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDING JUNE 30, 1965 5 (1966).
15 U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COMPENDIUM OF U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACTICES § 306 (3d ed.
2017), http://www.copyright.gov/comp3/docs/compendium.pdf. A subsequent section reiterates: [A]
work may be copyrightable . . . if the work was created by a human author . . Id. § 309.
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offers copyright to parties as an incentive for them to create socially
beneficial things.16 In other words, if society does not offer copyright
protections to potential authors, those authors will be reluctant to create new
works because third parties could so easily replicate those creations at little
to no cost to themselves.17 Hence, because in some cases AI systems develop
creative outputs with limited human input (and perhaps in the future, none),
they do not need incentives to undertake socially beneficial creative acts.18
We need not, therefore, dangle the copyright incentive before their
uncomprehending eyes.
Yet no AI systems are fully automated; they all require some amount of
human involvement (at least for now).19 Hence, some have argued that AI
outputs do deserve copyright protections because the AI systems are simply
tools that human authors use to create things, and withholding copyright
protections may disincentivize those human authors from utilizing the AI
tools to so create.20 This, in fact, was more or less the position of the
commission responsible for making recommendations to Congress leading
up to the last major revision of the Copyright Act in 1976; it viewed the
simply tools that an author uses to bring about their creative results.21 And by
denying these authors copyright in the fruits of their efforts, we may deny
them the appropriate incentives to undertake their creative efforts.22
But this question becomes a more difficult one when AI systems are
more capable than in previous eras at yielding their own creative outputs
without much human involvement at all.23
-and-paper
output copyrightability assumes that human authors remain the creative
geniuses behind the works, even if that genius utilizes AI and other
technologies in bringing about their creati
some AI systems require very little creative input from human beings in order
16 See, e.g., Christopher Jon Sprigman, Copyright and Creative Incentives: What We Know (and
Don t), 55 HOUS. L. REV. 451, 454 (2017) ( The grounding justification for copyright is that granting
exclusive rights in artistic and literary works will incentivize authors to invest in new creativity. ).
17 Id.
18 Clifford, supra note 3, at 1702 03 ( No extra incentives are needed to make currently available
creative computers produce works - if the computer program is executed, the works will result. ).
19 Arthur R. Miller, Copyright Protection for Computer Programs, Databases, and ComputerGenerated Works: Is Anything New Since CONTU?, 106 HARV. L. REV. 977, 1066 67 (1993).
20 Id. at 1067.
21 NAT L COMM N ON NEW TECH. USES OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS, FINAL REPORT OF THE
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON NEW TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS 4 (1978),
http://digital-law-online.info/CONTU/PDF/index.html.
22 Samuelson, supra note 1, at 1226 ( Perhaps the best reason to allocate ownership interests to
someone, however, is that someone must be motivated, if not to create the work, then to bring it into public
circulation. ).
23 Bridy, supra note 3, at 396 97.
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to generate highly creative outputs.24 And in the not-too-distant future, it may
be the case that AI systems are nearly entirely automated in generating their
own creative outputs. Hence, perhaps it becomes more justifiable to deny
these human authors copyright protections in the outputs of the AI systems
they use because in important respects they are not actually authors of those
outputs the AI systems increasingly are.
Some still view this scenario as mostly plain-vanilla copyright territory,
because, at the end of the day, no AI system is truly capable of authoring
anything without the involvement, at some level, of human authors.25 But the
level of involvement makes the question thornier for others if the human
author sets up the system initially but then does little thereafter, do they really
deserve or need copyright protections for the outputs of those systems?26
Scholars have proposed a number of possible solutions to this question,
including applying joint authorship and the works-made-for-hire doctrine to
AI-generated creative outputs.27 But each of these has limitations and fails to
fully resolve existing concerns.28
One of the most critical remaining concerns is that applying copyright
to AI-generated outputs will significantly inhibit creative efforts overall. For
instance, if a creative party utilizing AI is able to produce thousands or even
millions of copyrightable works in a short span of time, then each of those
thousands or millions of copyrights may stand in the way of other creative
parties wishing to make use of the same or similar expression in their own
creative efforts.29 AI technologies may thus foment a copyright
anticommons, where creative parties wishing to engage in their own creative
activities face so many AI-spawned copyright hurdles that they simply relent
in those efforts.30
A related concern is that as AI outputs increasingly become more the

24 See Annemarie Bridy, Coding Creativity: Copyright and the Artificially Intelligent Author,
2012 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 5, 10 15 (discussing how AI programs have grown more capable of producing
unpredictable yet creative results).
25 See Grimmelman, supra note 2.
26 See Boyden, supra note 4 (arguing that parties don t deserve copyright in AI-generated outputs
when the creativity manifest in those outputs is not directly traceable to the parties creative genius).
27 See Bridy, supra note 3 (examining applying the works-made-for-hire doctrine to AI-generated
outputs); Samuelson, supra note 1 (examining, among other options, joint authorship for AI-generated
outputs).
28 See Samuelson, supra note 1 (analyzing and critiquing a number of possible solutions to the
question of whether AI-generated outputs deserve copyright).
29 See Bianca Bosker, Philip Parker s Trick for Authoring over 1 Million Books: Don t Write,
HUFFPOST (Feb. 11, 2013, 8:59 AM), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/philip-parker-books_n_2648820
(discussing an academic s use of AI to produce millions of creative works, including books and poems).
30 See Clark D. Asay, Software s Copyright Anticommons, 66 EMORY L.J. 265 (2017) (discussing
such a phenomenon in the software context).
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involved, copyright simply loses its founding justification.31 And even going
beyond typical utilitarian justifications for copyright, we may be hesitant to
grant human authors copyright in their AI outputs if those outputs required
e purposes.32 Indeed, parties
developing such systems may have plenty of other incentives to continue to
create them, including market demand and other forms of intellectual
property protections such as patents.33 Copyright may thus lose its
justification because it is unnecessary as an incentive for parties to create
such AI systems, even if some of them would welcome the extra intellectual
property protections.
But others contest such a conclusion, believing that because the AI
deserve and are incentivized by copyright protections in the outputs of their
systems.34 Withholding copyright from them will thus result in less creative
output overall as developers shy away from creating AI systems whose
outputs they cannot own.35
And the debate goes round and round. There are many possible
independent creation defense, as well as the growing availability of AI
systems for assisting parties in their creative endeavors, helps alleviate some
of these concerns. The next Part explores how.
III. COPYRIGHT S FORGOTTEN DEFENSE
A.

Independent Creation Irrelevance

36

31

of
Thus, so long as

Boyden, supra note 4, at 388 89, 392.
Id. at 380, 393; see also Carys J. Craig & Ian R. Kerr, The Death of the AI Author 38 (Mar. 25,
2019)
(unpublished
manuscript)
(on
file
with
We
Robot
2019,
Miami),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3374951 (arguing that the state of AI s capabilities
make no difference as to whether AI can count as an author, because authorship is relational in a way that
AI systems may never be).
33 Patents, in fact, are the form of intellectual property protection most typically associated with
incentivizing technological innovation such as AI development. See Andrew W. Torrance & Bill
Tomlinson, Patents and the Regress of Useful Arts, 10 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 130, 132 (2009)
( Patent systems are usually justified by an assumption that they spur technological innovation. ).
34 Denicola, supra note 2, at 286 87.
35 Id. at 269.
32

36
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copyright laws.37 While the fixation requirement can cause the authors of
certain types of works headaches,38 the originality requirement is typically
viewed as the more important of the two copyrightability standards.39 Indeed,
ock principle of
40
copyright . .
What, exactly, does originality entail? According to the Supreme Court,
41

The creativity
required for some work to qualify for copyright protection thus need not be
much; even a mote will do.42
Combined, these two requirements of originality thus mean that two or
more parties can come up with the same or similar creative expression, so
long as they do so independent of one another.43
independent creation requirement simultaneously imposes a copyright
limitation, commonly referred to as the independent creation defense to
copyright infringement.44 If successfully wielded, the defense provides
multiple parties copyright protections in their respective creations, even if
identical or similar, so long as each of the parties did not copy their creative
expression from anyone else.45
Consequently, if someone produced the Harry Potter series in nearly
identical form as J.K. Rowling, that second party would technically be in the
clear, legally speaking, so long as they produced the material independent of
J.K. Rowling. They would also have copyright rights in their Harry Potter
replica, leading to the counterintuitive result that both parties owned
copyright in the same material. And while either party could still assert their
rights against the rest of the world for copying their works, neither party
would have a copyright cause of action against the other.
37 See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1) (8) (2019) (providing a non-exhaustive list of the categories of
works that can qualify for copyright protection).
38 Megan M. Carpenter, If It s Broke, Fix It: Fixing Fixation, 39 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 355, 359
60 (2016) (detailing many problems with the fixation requirements in a number of contexts).
39 Feist Publ ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 347 (1991).
40 Id.
41

Id. at 345.
Arianna D. Chronis, The Inky Ambiguity of Tattoo Copyrights: Addressing the Silence of U.S.
Copyright Law on Tattooed Works, 104 IOWA L. REV. 1483, 1487 (2019) (referencing the oft-stated
maxim that copyright protection requires a modicum of creativity, which is typically satisfied if an
author uses some (however small) amount of creativity ).
43 Christopher Brett Jaeger, Does That Sound Familiar? : Creators Liability for Unconscious
Copyright Infringement, 61 VAND. L. REV. 1903, 1912 13 (2008).
44 See Clarisa Long, Information Costs in Patent and Copyright, 90 VA. L. REV. 465, 526 (2004)
(discussing the defense).
45 Gideon Parchomovsky & Alex Stein, Intellectual Property Defenses, 113 COLUM. L. REV.
1483, 1493 94 (2013).
42
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Of course, the above scenario is an impossible one; no one could ever
actually replicate the Harry Potter series, utilizing the same or similar
expression, independent of J.K. Rowling. And even if they somehow
magically did, courts would be unlikely to believe them, because courts often
infer that parties did not independently develop some creative expression if
that expression mirrors too closely the copyrighted works of another.46
Indeed, in some cases a
leads courts to largely dispense with other evidentiary considerations and
conclude that the party must have, in fact, copied the copyrighted work to
create their own.47 The independent creation defense is thus largely illusory
in many contexts, even if it sounds nice in theory.
In other contexts, the independent creation defense might be said to have
greater potency. For instance, parties often purport to rely on the defense in
techniques.48 In these scenarios, parties find a
competitive product that they wish to copy.49 Software programs are a typical
candidate.50 Knowing that they cannot directly copy the software code
the company
simply figures out what the ideas behind the program are and commissions
their engineers to implement those ideas in their own program utilizing
independently written software code.51
Yet even in this context, other copyright limitations are actually carrying
much of the weight in limiting copyright. For instance, the primary reason
that the subsequent company is able to replicate the ideas behind their
rather because the ideas behind the program are not copyrightable
expression.52 The independent creation defense does allow the subsequent
developers to create their own copyrightable expression implementing those
ideas. But in most cases that new software code will not mirror the software
code of their competitor, meaning that the two parties have not independently
46 Jaeger, supra note 43, at 1911 (discussing the phenomenon of unconscious copying);
Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, The Freedom to Copy: Copyright, Creation, and Context, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
477, 536 37 (2007) (discussing how courts sometimes infer access, and thus lack of independent creation,
based on striking similarity ).
47 See, e.g., Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946) ( If evidence of access is absent,
the similarities must be so striking as to preclude the possibility that plaintiff and defendant independently
arrived at the same result. ).
48 Peter S. Menell, Rise of the API Copyright Dead?: An Updated Epitaph for Copyright
Protection of Network and Functional Features of Computer Software, 31 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 305, 474
(2018).
49 Id.
50

Id.
Id.
52 Allen D. Madison, The Uncopyrightability of Jokes, 35 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 111, 116 (1998)
(discussing this limitation within copyright law).
51
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developed identical or similar software expression. They have simply
implemented non-copyrightable ideas, which the idea-expression dichotomy
in copyright law allows, not the independent creation defense.53
Relatedly, when parties independently include common themes,
s
scenes a faire doctrine precludes protection in those elements.54 This doctrine
prevents parties from having copyright in elements of a copyrighted work
that are deemed to be indispensable to or customary in a particular field.55
For instance, if a party were to write a book about salmon migrations, that
party could not claim copyright in elements that are necessary to writing a
book about such migrations, including the presence of hungry bears, the
upstream migration back to the spawning grounds, and so forth.56 Others
wishing to write about a similar topic would be entitled to include these
elements in their own works, despite the initial author including them in their
work first.57
Hence, often the reason subsequent creators are able to include similar
or the same elements in their own follow-on works is not because of
independent creation indeed, similarities between the two works may often
lead courts to reject claims of independent creation, even if the courts do not
ultimately find copyright infringement.58 Instead, courts are likely to allow
replication of these stock elements because they are not copyrightable
expression under the scenes a faire limitation. It may be true that parties
independently developed the same elements in their respective works, and so
it might be said that the independent creation defense has some role to play,
particularly in disproving factual copying under the first prong of a typical
copyright infringement analysis.59 But similar to the idea-expression context,
the reality is that the main reason we allow parties to replicate such common
elements is because, lacking the creative spark that we reserve for
copyrightable expression, we do not believe that they should be subject to

53

Id.

54

See generally Leslie A. Kurtz, Copyright: The Scenes a Faire Doctrine, 41 FLA. L. REV. 79
(1989) (giving a general overview of this doctrine).
55 Alexander v. Haley, 460 F. Supp. 40, 45 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (defining scenes a faire as incidents,
characters or settings which are as a practical matter indispensable, or at least standard, in the treatment
of a given topic ).
56 Clark D. Asay, Intellectual Property Law Hybridization, 87 U. COLO. L. REV. 65, 77 78 (2016).
57

Kurtz, supra note 54.
See generally Alan Latman, Probative Similarity as Proof of Copying: Toward Dispelling
Some Myths in Copyright Infringement, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1187 (1990).
59 Id.
58
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copyright at all.60 If such elements were copyrightable expression because
they contained creativity, we would almost certainly subject others to
copyright liability for utilizing similar elements, even if independently
derived, because we would doubt their independence claims.61 But lacking
the desired creativity, we mostly dispense with the independence question
altogether and deny those elements copyright protection on the basis of the
scenes a faire doctrine.
carries some of the weight that the independent creation defense may
otherwise shoulder. This doctrine holds that when only one or a limited
number of ways exist to express an idea, that idea merges with those limited
number of expressive choices such that copyright protection ceases to exist.62
Hence, two parties may independently come up with bumble bee earrings that
are nearly identical in appearance if those similarities owe to the physiology
of actual bees.63 If one party were to sue the other, one defense that the sued
party may raise is that they independently developed the bee earrings. And
that defense may ultimately prove successful. Yet similar to the ideaexpression and scenes a faire contexts, the main reason we might lend that
defense credibility is because the earrings both derive from the appearance
of actual bees, and so their similarities are understandable. In other words,
those similarities are simply not copyrightable expression. Hence, in such
cases, principles of merger carry most of the weight in limiting copyright,
even if independent creation appears to play a prominent role.
In sum, in many copyright contexts, independent creation is simply an
impossibility, such that the defense rarely if ever plays an important role in
limiting copyright. And while in other contexts we may often point to
independent creation as playing a role in allowing parties to develop similar
works, typically the idea-expression, scenes a faire, and merger doctrines do
much of the actual work in limiting copyright protections. But in the AI
context, the independent creation defense is poised to play a much larger role
in allowing parties to produce similar creative results without incurring
liability. The next section explores how.

60 See Comput. Assocs. Int l v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 715 (2d Cir. 1992) (quoting NIMMER ON
COPYRIGHT § 13.03[F][3] (2019)) (identifying scenes a faire as elements of a work that follow naturally
from the work s theme rather than from the author s creativity ).
61 See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
62 Bryan L. Frye, Against Creativity, 11 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 426, 439 (2017) (describing the
merger doctrine as a gloss on the idea-expression dichotomy ).
63 Timothy S. Teter, Merger and the Machines: An Analysis of the Pro-Compatibility
Trend in Computer Software Cases, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1061, 1073 74 (1993) (discussing case law barring
copyright protection in bee jewelry due to merger of the expression with the idea).
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With AI, the independent creation defense is set to play a much more
meaningful role than in more traditional copyright infringement contexts.
This is because multiple parties utilizing AI are more capable of
independently creating similar creative works than mere mortals lacking AI
assistance. This greater role for the independent creation defense, in turn, can
help address some of the concerns of those who worry about the
copyrightability of AI outputs.
Of course, as discussed above, AI systems are not yet capable of
producing creative outputs entirely on their own, though they may be inching
in that direction ever so slowly.64 But widely available AI tools do provide
humans with the means by which to produce significant numbers of creative
outputs in relatively short order; often, all it takes is a little input regarding
what the human author wishes to create.65 And in enabling such mass
production of creative works, these AI systems enhance the likelihood of
independent creation of similar creative works by distinct parties, particularly
in cases where parties utilize similar inputs and AI tools.
For instance, recent developments in text generation AI have
even producing essays and o
on standardized tests.66 In the news industry, large news producers regularly
use AI to produce thousands and even millions of stories.67 The human input
necessary for this content creation is often as simple as selecting topics and
keywords or providing some sort of writing prompt.68 Hence, if distinct
parties were to utilize the same or similar AI text generation programs and
select the same prompts, keywords, or topics as their inputs, in some cases
they may very well receive similar creative outputs. Indeed, the likelihood of
similar creative outputs may increase as the required human inputs become

64 See
Sarvasv Kulpati, Can AI Be Creative?, MEDIUM (July 27, 2018),
https://towardsdatascience.com/can-ai-be-creative-2f84c5c73dca (discussing the state of AI creativity).
65 James Vincent, OpenAI s New Multitalented AI Writes, Translates, and Slanders, THE VERGE
(Feb. 14, 2019, 12:00 PM), https://www.theverge.com/2019/2/14/18224704/ai-machine-learninglanguage-models-read-write-openai-gpt2 (discussing recent advances in text prediction AI).
66 Id.
67 Nicole Martin, Did a Robot Write This? How AI Is Impacting Journalism, FORBES (Feb. 8,
2019, 11:41 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/nicolemartin1/2019/02/08/did-a-robot-write-this-howai-is-impacting-journalism/#1a22f4af7795.
68 Id.; see also Tristan Greene, This Terrifying AI Generates Fake Articles from Any News Site,
THENEXTWEB (June 2019), https://thenextweb.com/artificial-intelligence/2019/06/24/this-terrifying-aigenerates-fake-articles-from-any-news-site/ (discussing AI that can mass produce fake news articles);
Vincent, supra note 65.
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ever more simple, particularly in cases where parties utilize the same basic
AI systems trained on similar data.69
AI tools also exist for producing artwork, including paintings that in
some cases have sold for nearly half a million dollars.70 Humans obviously
still remain involved, providing critical input for the artistic direction that the
AI tool pursues in rendering the art.71 But more and more of the artistic
rendering is becoming automated, in such a way that humans utilizing such
systems can produce thousands of artistic works in a short period of time.72
When two or more persons utilizing the same or similar AI systems provide
the same or similar inputs to these systems, the result may be that some of
those thousands of works of art are similar in their respective artistic
expression.
with a little direction from humans is expanding rapidly.73 Similar to other
areas, AI does not currently have the capability to produce musical works
entirely on its own.74 Yet its ability to help spawn thousands of new musical
works in relatively short periods of time has grown, such that companies and
musicians increasingly rely on AI tools to help them produce high-quality
musical works.75 And while perhaps most of these new works will differ from
those created by others, alike creative outputs are certainly not out of the
question as parties utilize similar AI algorithms and inputs in generating their
new musical outputs.
This is where the independent creation defense, mostly impotent in
previous eras, becomes more capable of providing a defense against claims
of copyright infringement. For instance, in the first phase of a typical
copyright infringement analysis, when parties usually raise the independent
creation defense, courts are more likely to accept the defense in the AI

69

Kulpati, supra note 64.
Soo Youn, Christie s Auctions the First AI-Produced Art, and the Gavel Price Was Staggering,
ABCNEWS (Oct. 25, 2018, 5:31 AM), https://abcnews.go.com/Business/christies-sells-ai-produced-arthalf-million-dollars/story?id=58749667.
71 Thomas Graham, Art Made by AI Is Selling for Thousands Is It Any Good?, BBC (Dec. 12,
2018), http://www.bbc.com/culture/story/20181210-art-made-by-ai-is-selling-for-thousands-is-it-anygood.
72 Id.
70

73 Stuart Dredge, Music Created by Artificial Intelligence Is Better than You Think, MEDIUM (Feb.
1, 2019), https://medium.com/s/story/music-created-by-artificial-intelligence-is-better-than-you-thinkce73631e2ec5 (discussing the state of the AI music industry).
74 Nir Livneh, Can AI Create Better Music than Humans?, FORBES (Nov. 26, 2018, 9:00 AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbestechcouncil/2018/11/26/can-ai-create-better-music-thanhumans/#1164b1d11936.
75 Dredge, supra note 73.
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context than in others.76 This is because it is more likely, and thus believable,
that the AI technologies, unlike their human counterparts, are capable of
yielding probatively similar creative expression independent of access to or
copying from another source.77 Indeed, similarity without actual copying
becomes all the more likely when considering that these systems are capable
of producing thousands and even millions of works within short periods of
time based on simple inputs from human beings; at least some of those
thousands or millions of outputs are likely to be similar to those of another
similarly fertile AI system whose human counterpart utilized related inputs.78
Hence, the independent creation defense may help alleviate concerns
from some that subjecting AI outputs to copyright will result in a copyright
infringement bloodbath, in part because courts are more likely to lend
credence to the defense in the AI context than in more traditional ones.
Furthermore, creative parties utilizing AI systems may be less prone to sue
others who create similar creative content, in part because they will
understand that independent creation of similar creative outputs is more
likely in the AI context than in others.
One important issue that the independent creation defense does not
resolve, however, is when an AI system creates a work that is similar to a
work used as an input to the AI system. AI tools for creating new works are
typically trained on thousands or even millions of inputs.79 Those using AI
tools to create visual art, for instance, often feed thousands of pieces of art
into the AI system, which uses that input to figure out patterns in the input
that it can then follow in rendering its own creative works.80 Hence, it may
not be altogether surprising if that AI tool renders some works with similar
outputs are, after all, in some sense derived from its inputs. Consequently, it
would be difficult to successfully argue an independent creation defense
when an AI output mimics the creative elements of one or many of its inputs,

76 Mark A. Lemley, Our Bizarre System for Proving Copyright Infringement, 57 J. COPYRIGHT
SOC Y U.S.A. 719, 719 20 (2010) (discussing this first prong).
77

Id.
See, e.g., Tom Simonite, We Made Our Own Artificial Intelligence Art, and So Can You, WIRED
(Nov. 20, 2019, 6:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/we-made-artificial-intelligence-art-so-can-you/
(discussing one person s experience in using open source AI tools to create visual art that in resembled
other AI-assisted works that recently sold at an auction for nearly half a million dollars).
79 Gregory Barber, AI Needs Your Data And You Should Get Paid for It, WIRED (Aug. 8, 2019,
7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/ai-needs-data-you-should-get-paid/ ( AI algorithms can require
thousands or even millions of data points. ).
80 Simonite, supra note 78.
78
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are in some sense purposeful.81
In such scenarios, other copyright doctrines would need to step in to
limit copyright, if at all. The idea-expression, scenes a faire, and merger
doctrines, as discussed above, may excuse many similarities between inputs
and outputs of AI systems, simply because those similarities are not
copyrightable expression. Furthermore, as discussed in greater detail below
in Part III, the fair use doctrine is likely to play a role in allowing for certain
uses of training data. Hence, while the independent creation defense is set to
play a bigger role in mediating copyright conflicts arising between multiple
parties that use AI to produce creative outputs, it naturally falls short of
settling all copyright issues arising in the context of AI systems more
generally.
Indeed, despite the independent creation defense helping alleviate some
concerns, another outstanding issue is that subjecting millions of AI outputs
to copyright still clutters the field with copyright landmines. For instance, as
parties increasingly rely on AI systems to help produce thousands and even
millions of creative outputs, the creative landscape simply becomes ever
more difficult to navigate if those outputs are subject to copyright, with or
without a viable independent creation defense. After all, parties may wish to
use some of those outputs rather than create their own, but may often face
difficulties in getting permission to do so.82 Independent creation thus
provides little reassurance in cases where parties wish to make use of some
of the millions of the copyrighted AI outputs, simply because those uses
would not be independently derived.
But the growing availability of AI systems can provide some
reassurance on this front as well. For instance, the availability of AI systems
capable of mass-producing thousands and even millions of creative outputs
in a relatively short timeframe means that third parties wishing to avoid
already copyrighted creative outputs have an easier time working around
those outputs in producing their own. Thus, though subjecting AI outputs to
copyright means that the creative landscape may become increasingly
cluttered with rights clearance issues, one means by which authors can
navigate that landscape is to simply further clutter it with their own AIassisted outputs. Of course, this still does nothing to address the concern of

81 Latman, supra note 58, at 1206 07 (discussing the first prong of the copyright infringement
analysis as assessing whether a party actually copied material from another based on whether the party
had access to the material and the level of similarity between the two works).
82 See, e.g., Lydia Pallas Loren, Redefining the Market Failure Approach to Fair Use in an Era of
Copyright Permissions Systems, 5 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 5 6 (1997) (discussing some of the possible
causes of market failure in copyright markets).
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being able to use specific copyrighted AI outputs, and the next Part looks into
that issue in greater detail.
In sum, if parties wish to use an output that shares some similarities with
another AI output, they may be able to rely on the independent creation
defense if those similarities arise
than actual copying. But if they wish to avoid that headache altogether,
creative parties can simply utilize widely available AI systems to come up
with an option that is distinct from other copyrighted AI outputs. Thus, while
subjecting AI outputs to copyright still presents some difficulties, as
discussed in greater detail below, the independent creation defense, as well
as the availability of AI systems, provides creative parties with a number of
ways by which to avoid copyright conflicts.
IV. REMAINING CONCERNS
As alluded to above, one significant copyright issue that the independent
creation defense and AI more generally fail to fully address is that parties
may wish to use particular AI outputs in their creative efforts, and copyright
may stand in the way of those wishes. For instance, though AI systems can
generate thousands and even millions of creative outputs in a relatively short
period of time, the reality is that some AI outputs will be better than others.83
Hence, a party wishing to use some AI output would not be able to rely on
the independent creation defense to the extent that they set out to replicate it,
even if they were to rely on an AI tool in that replication effort. They may be
able to rely on the idea-expression, scenes a faire, or merger doctrines to the
extent that what they wish to copy is not copyrightable expression. Yet in
many cases, it is precisely the expression that the party may wish to replicate.
Furthermore, because the particular AI output is the desired result, it makes
no sense to say that AI systems would allow the party to come up with their
own distinct output, because that distinct output is not what the party wants.
This does indeed present a concern. But it is certainly not one that is
unique to AI outputs and their copyrightability. It is certainly the case that if
we were to withhold copyright from AI outputs, third parties could more
easily use them in their own creative efforts. But then, the debate again
resurfaces as to whether parties, absent copyright, have proper incentives to
use AI to produce creative outputs in the first place.84 Otherwise, the
copyright situation seems similar to other types of scenarios involving
83 Kelsey Piper, A Poetry-Writing AI Has Just Been Unveiled. It s . . . Pretty Good, VOX (May 15,
2019, 3:08 PM), https://www.vox.com/2019/5/15/18623134/openai-language-ai-gpt2-poetry-try-it
(discussing the outputs of a text generation AI, with some being quite sophisticated and others being quite
bad).
84 See supra notes 1 4 and accompanying text.
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creative works that others wish to use. The magnitude of outputs that AI
enables may seem to make a difference, yet the reality is that the sheer
number of copyrighted AI outputs makes little difference in the final analysis.
People will wish to make use of some of those outputs and not others. For
those copyrighted AI outputs that they wish to make use of, typical copyright
questions will arise.
Arguably the most important copyright question in this context is
whether use of the
use of that
defense to claims of copyright infringement.85 It primarily consists of a fourfactor statutory test that courts use to determine whether disallowing the use
86

Hence, courts often find uses to be a fair use in cases where they deem,
overall, that the use promotes rather than inhibits creative efforts.87 Fair use,
for instance, is a key to allowing parties to create parodies, critiques,
commentaries, news reporting, and other forms of creative efforts that utilize
copyrighted works in them.88 It also enables a number of educational and
technological uses of copyrighted works that would otherwise constitute
copyright infringement.89
While the fact that AI was used to help create some creative output may
not require any new copyright doctrines or limitations, that reality may affect
our analyses under existing ones, including the fair use doctrine. For instance,
s four-factor test requires courts to look into the nature
of the copyrighted work, the idea being that more creative works deserve
greater copyright protections (and thus fewer fair use allowances), while less
creative works deserve fewer protections (and thus more fair use
allowances).90 This is so, the thinking goes, because more creative works are
precisely the type of work that copyright law is meant to encourage, while
works consisting mostly of facts, ideas, or other less creative material are
91
further
85 MARSHALL A. LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW 495 (6th ed. 2014) (indicating that
fair use is by far the most important defense to an action for copyright infringement ).
86 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994) (quoting Stewart v. Abend, 495
U.S. 207, 236 (1990)).
87 Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of the
Betamax Case and Its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600 (1982) (discussing the fair use doctrine as
a solution to various types of market failure).
88 Clark D. Asay, Transformative Use in Software, 70 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 9 (2017) (discussing
some of these uses).
89 Id.
90 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586 (opining that [t]his factor calls for recognition that some works are
closer to the core of intended copyright protection than others. ).
91 Id.
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Traditionally, the second factor of the fair use test has played little to no
role in determining the outcomes of fair use cases.92 Courts typically include
it in their fair use analyses because it is listed in the Copyright Act as one of
the statutory factors.93 But courts may as well omit it in the vast majority of
cases, as it seems to have little influence on how courts actually decide fair
use cases.94
But in the AI context, the second factor would seem to deserve a greater
role. This may be so because although many AI outputs are overall creative,
the human input involved in producing the work may have been relatively
minimal (such as providing a keyword or brief prompt).95 In other words,
much of the creativit
internal workings than human efforts, in which case the limited human
creativity involved in generating the output means that the second factor
pushes in favor of a finding of fair use. Of course, this will not always be the
case the simple fact that AI was used in a creative effort does not
automatically mean that the human author did not employ significant
amounts of creativity in creating the output. In many cases, in fact, an AI
s may be largely dependent on the efforts of a
human counterpart.96 But at least in some cases, when human input is
minimal, this factor would seem to push in favor of a finding of fair use.
Some may counter this point by arguing that creating the AI system
itself involves significant amounts of creativity. Hence, the creative output
may actually reflect significant human creativity when taking into account
the creativity involved in structuring the AI system. In some circumstances,
this may be true; an author who structures an AI system in a specific way so
as to achieve a particular artistic result has a greater claim on copyright
protections than others. In such cases, the second factor may actually push
against a finding of fair use. But in many other cases, where humans neither
92 See, e.g., Clark D. Asay et al., Is Transformative Use Eating the World?, 61 B.C. L. REV. 1, 39
(2020) (finding that the second factor and its outcome are very rarely associated with the ultimate outcome
of the overall fair use test). But see Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of U.S. Copyright Fair Use
Opinions, 1978 2005, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 549, 563 64 (2008) (finding that certain subfactors of the factor
two analysis may have some weight in influencing overall fair use outcomes).
93 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2019) (listing the fair use factors as a non-exhaustive list of things courts may
consider when assessing whether a use is fair).
94 Asay, supra note 88, at 9 10; see, e.g., Warren Publ g Co. v. Spurlock, 645 F. Supp. 2d 402,
415 (E.D. Pa. 2009) (finding that though factor two disfavored fair use, its impact in the overall fair use
calculus was limited because of other, more important considerations).
95 This idea, in some respects, syncs up nicely with Bruce Boyden s contention that AI-generated
works should not be subject to copyright to the extent that the creativity found in these works cannot be
directly traced to a human author s creative purposes. See Boyden, supra note 4, at 379.
96 Eleanor Lawrie, Could a Computer Ever Create Better Art than a Human?, BBC (Apr. 23,
2019), https://www.bbc.com/news/business-47700701 ( So rather than letting AI take complete control,
results seem to be far more fruitful when human artists work hand-in-hand with machines. ).
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have much involvement in creating the AI system nor are required to supply
the system with much artistic direction, those humans have a lesser claim on
copyright protections in whatever creative outputs the system spits out. In
such scenarios, the second factor of the fair use test would push in favor of
allowing reuses of their AI-assisted outputs.
Courts may also assess the third factor of the fair use test differently
ctor looks to
97

When a second comer uses a significant amount of the copyrighted
work in their subsequent work, that typically counts against a finding of fair
use.98 Furthermore, even small amounts used may count against fair use when
creative efforts.99
Similar to the second factor, when an author contributed little creativity
to the creation of a work, a follow-on creator utilizing that work arguably has
the third factor may push in favor of a fair use finding. In many cases, of
course, it will be difficult to determine where a huma
will be so intertwined with the end product that parsing between the two will
become an impossible task. But in others, it may be quite clear that a human
a
and the AI tool did the rest. In such cases, when follow-on creators make use
of the AI
difficult to argue that the follow100
And when that is the case, the third
factor should push in favor of a fair use finding.
analy
101

Under this factor, courts assess whether

potential market for the work.102 For instance, if the type of use under
consideration were to become widespread, would the economic prospects of

97

17 U.S.C. § 107(3) (2019).

98

See generally R. Anthony Reese, How Much Is Too Much?: Campbell and the Third Fair Use
Factor, 90 WASH. L. REV. 755 (2015).
99

Id.
Peter Letterese & Assocs. v. World Inst. of Scientology Enters. Int l, 533 F.3d 1287, 1314
(11th Cir. 2008).
101 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (2019).
102 See generally David Fagundes, Market Harm, Market Help, and Fair Use, 17 STAN. TECH. L.
REV. 359 (2014) (discussing the fourth fair use factor s history).
100
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the copyright owner suffer significantly?103 In essence, this factor looks to
whether the contemplated use acts as a market substitute for the original
copyrighted work.104 Often, if the use is for a commercial purpose, the court
will presume market harm to the original.105
The fact that a party used AI to create the work may bear on whether
et for it. For
instance, if the work does not really have much of a market because others
can, and so readily do, create their own works through the use of AI tools,
this may make allowing use of the work more tolerable. Of course, if a
dispute arises over
suggests at least some market for the work exists, in spite of the reality that
others may readily employ AI to create their own distinct creative outputs.
Yet that may still bear on the factor four discussion, because we may deem
that a market of one (or a few) is simply not a market worth protecting.
Harking back to factors two and three, this may be particularly true if an
est.
This analysis of fair use principles in the AI context bears a strong
resemblance to scholarship arguing that AI outputs should not be subject to
copyright when the AI, rather than the human author, is responsible for the
creativity found in the output.106 One might reasonably argue that denying
copyright protections in the first place is a much sounder approach than
forcing parties to go through the costly court system to determine who can
do what. Indeed, complaints about the unpredictability of fair use outcomes
have sounded for some time, though others have cast significant doubts on
this alleged unpredictability.107 But the point remains that litigation is
expensive, and parties not knowing what their rights are, ex ante, infuses a
significant amount of uncertainty into the marketplace, meaning that using
AI outputs becomes that much more difficult.
But in the AI context, the fair use defense, as opposed to denying
copyright protections entirely, has several things in its favor. First, its fourfactor test for determining whether a use is permissible allows for greater
nuance in assessing particular uses of AI outputs. AI varies widely, with
different systems requiring different amounts of human involvement for
creative outputs to come about. Humans can also alter AI systems to suit their
particular creative goals. Hence, adopting a one-size-fits-all-approach to AI
103 Jeanne C. Fromer, Market Effects Bearing on Fair Use, 90 WASH. L. REV. 615 (2015)
(discussing fair use s factor four).
104 Id.
105

Beebe, supra note 92, at 601 (discussing this presumption).
See, e.g., Boyden, supra note 4.
107 See Matthew Sag, Predicting Fair Use, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 47, 48 49, 51 (2012); Pamela
Samuelson, Unbundling Fair Uses, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2537, 2537, 2540 41 (2009).
106
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outputs by denying them all copyright protections makes little sense
when the systems and their capacities vary so widely. Fair use, with its
multiple factors to consider, provides a better tool for determining on a caseby-case basis whether reuse of a particular output should be permitted.
Second, though whether a particular use counts as fair will always
remain indeterminate until a court says so, developing fair use norms can help
settle many fair use questions, without parties having to resort to a court. For
instance, over time certain practices can become widely accepted as fair uses,
such that people begin to regularly undertake those uses with very little fair
use litigation following in their wake. Indeed, this has happened with respect
to more traditional types of uses. Hence, as AI and its creative capacities
become more entrenched in the marketplace, it is likely that fair use cases
and discussions will follow. And as they follow, greater clarity will emerge
about which types of uses count as fair use. As that clarity emerges, fair use
will thus help allow for uses of AI outputs where low levels of human
creativity were involved, while barring uses where higher levels of human
creativity are manifest.108
V.

CONCLUSION

Scholars have long squabbled over the copyrightability of AI-generated
output. This issue is becoming all the more important as AI gets closer and
closer to autonomously generating its own creative output. My point in this
Essay is not that these debates are without merit, but that we have several
important tools at our disposal to combat some of the most worrisome issues
relating to the copyright status of AI outputs.
One is that a long-standing copyright limitation independent
creation may actually begin to live up to its hype. While this defense has
had some relevance in the past, it has mostly lain dormant, because
independent creation of similar creative expression in most cases is simply
impossible. In the AI context, the likelihood of similar creative outputs
increases. Hence, those that worry that subjecting AI outputs to copyright
will inhibit creative activity can take some comfort in knowing that the
108 Another AI-related fair use question concerns whether using copyrighted works as inputs to
AI systems constitutes copyright infringement or is, instead, a fair use. As alluded to throughout, AI
systems depend on human input, including at times copyrighted works, to yield their creative outputs. AI
systems are also typically trained on massive datasets, and some portions of those datasets are often subject
to copyright protections. If copyright were to apply to these types of activities without a fair use defense,
creating and operating many AI systems would become nearly impossible. Others have persuasively
argued in favor of allowing these types of uses for data mining and AI training purposes. See Matthew
Sag, The New Legal Landscape for Text Mining and Machine Learning, 66 J. COPYRIGHT SOC Y U.S.A.
1, 3, 23, 64 (2019). I will not review those arguments here other than to add my general support in favor
of their arguments.
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independent creation defense may frequently shield purported infringers
from copyright trouble.
Furthermore, the widespread availability of AI tools for assisting
creative parties enhances their ability to circumvent copyrighted works in
creating their own distinct output. This does not alleviate the concern that
some parties may wish to use a particular copyrighted AI output in their own
creative efforts, rather than independently come up with their own. Yet the
fair use limitation remains a possible solution to such holdup problems, and
in many cases the involvement of AI in generating a particular output should
push the scales in favor of fair use.

